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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS

DE PROFANITATE

"LOGIC must correspond to a fact of psychology," observed Charles Peirce, "or it degenerates into a mathematical recreation." The observation was quoted by Royce at his "logical seminary," one evening during the last year of the seminary's existence. Royce had been seated at the head of the long oak table, with chin in his hands as usual, and on his face the look of a day-dreaming child whose thoughts were in fairyland. Those who did not know him might have judged that his thoughts were remote from the discussions which took place across the table—but had any one thought so, the sequel would have proved him wrong. Royce had been assembling his battery and preparing to hit the center of the argument.

A professor of philosophy had just been discussing the meaning of implication, he had been expounding Bosanquet and had talked of hypothetical propositions and of conditional propositions which do not assert the existence of anything. Another had replied to him with an exposition of the views of Bertrand Russell, and the discussion at length concentrated on the question whether, at the beginning of a logical undertaking, it can be assumed or ought to be admitted that a false proposition implies a true proposition. One party asserted that a false proposition implies any proposition whatsoever, another offered observations on the "independence of postulates," the blackboard was quickly covered with symbols, and the discussion bade fair to become a discussion of what rules the assembly was willing to accept as the rules of the game of logistic. We were in imminent danger of deserting the thinking process altogether for the play with symbols which is called mathematical logic. At this point Professor Royce, for a long time silent, jumped squarely upon the central issue. Whether we choose for a postulate that a false proposition implies any proposition, is, after all, not a matter of tremendous purport. The important and real question is whether a false proposition in our actual thinking does or does not imply any proposition whatever—not whether it can, but whether it does. Do we find it

functioning in this way in our habitual thinking? We do. Professor Royce illustrated the fact by quoting popular profanity, the Book of Ruth, a Gilbert and Sullivan opera, a sonnet of Shakespeare, current slang, the Church of England marriage service, a lyric of William Blake, and the use of certain adverbs in three of the languages of Europe.

When the clergyman in the story-book is confronted with a circumstance which he has not foreseen or which he has believed impossible, he says "I am blessed if it isn't!"—and intends to indicate his astonishment that the thing undeniably is as it proves to be. By the same speech with which he voices his surprise that it isn't, he voices also his confidence that it is. His satisfaction concerning it is so perfect that if, by any chance, it were not so, he would assert that he is living in that state of blessedness for which he has so long hoped that he now dares scarcely to aspire to it.

The average citizen, on the other hand, encountering an unexpected state of affairs, says of it, "Well, I'll be damned if it isn't!" Obviously it is, and no doubt about it. When he offers to be cheerfully damned if it isn't, he is keeping well within the margin of safety. But the logic works both ways. Surely it is apparent that no man wants to be damned. Indeed the speaker, when he asserts his willingness to be damned if and on the condition that it isn't, appeals to whoever hears him to perceive the obvious, to perceive that the proposition that he is willing to be damned is a false proposition—and to infer, from this false proposition, the true proposition that the thing is.

Some offer to be cursed, or tortured, or badgered in a variety of ways, some call down upon themselves the malevolence of the elements and of the deities, they offer to accept misfortunes which no one would willingly undergo—all to prove, by the assertion of a false proposition, that some other proposition is true. The word, damn, has become bad usage. When the Captain of H.M.S. Pinafore has asserted that he never, or hardly ever, swore "with a big, big D," the chorus responds:

> Then give three cheers and one cheer more,
> For the *well-bred* Captain of the Pinafore!

The majority of the people, the larger part of the time, try to find for their use in giving vigor and emphasis to their expression some word which has not thus become an emblem of bad taste, "May I be struck dumb if I am not speaking the truth" is a case in point, and the expression "May the Lord pour out his wrath upon me if this is not true" translates literally to the rubber-stamp profanity of the stage and the street. The well-bred person can and does swear with entire propriety if he is guarded in his choice of words.

In one of the finest lyric passages of all literature, Ruth, swearing to be forever devoted to Naomi, enumerates ways in which her devotion will find concrete expression—"thy people shall be my people; whither thou goest, I will go; where thou diest I will die, and there shall I be buried" and concludes her appeal with the oath, "May the Lord do so to me and more also, if aught but death part thee and me," The passage is high poetry, but the oath may be paraphrased perfectly by the commonest cursing of the American idiom.

The youthful enthusiast swears loyalty to his purpose "till Hell freezes over" or "until there shall be the Millennium upon Earth" —according to his taste. It comes to the same thing in either case, for neither is likely to happen. Both are practical contradictions in terms. When the false shall be true, then it will be true that he will be false to the object of his loyalty. So long as false is false and true is true, for better for worse, for richer for poorer, in sickness and in health, anyway, he will be devoted to his choice. While the false is recognized as false, the truth of what he swears is implied and demonstrated.

Logicians argue whether a false proposition implies a true proposition—and the man of everyday, who knows that it does, goes blithely ahead and certifies it whenever he swears. And we all swear—in hard words or in soft—for all swearing is not vulgar language, and there is much swearing that is not cursing. The man of everyday, when he swears, fulfils the pragmatist specification by acting as if a false proposition implies a true one. But he also does better than that. He finds in his thinking process, "in the field" as the geologist would say, in the thinking process which is the laboratory of logic, false propositions constantly implying and demonstrating true ones. It is not a thing to be argued. It is a fact of psychology.

In the sonnet where he describes the constancy of true love, Shakespeare, having concluded his exposition, wishes to say that he is confident of its correctness, and adds:

> If this be error and upon me proved,
> I never writ, nor no man ever loved.

Obviously he has written, and obviously men have loved. By this token therefore his remarks about true love are not error, but are true. Indeed if things as obviously true as they were false, then anything would be true—and the laws of right thinking would no longer have any relevancy and pertinence.

Hamlet knew very well that a false proposition implies any

proposition, as is testified by his conversation with Rosencrantz and Guildenstern wherein he plays a logical trick upon them and parries, when in their turn they try the same trick on him, leading them away into a discussion of the subjectivity of judgments of value and flippantly to one of the central problems of metaphysics. To his inquiry, "What news?" Rosencrantz replies, "None, my lord, but that the world's grown honest." Hamlet answers, "Then is doomsday near; but your news is not true." If a proposition as palpably false as this, that the world has grown honest, were by any chance true, then anything would be true, then doomsday would be near. But the proposition happily is not true. Hamlet then inquires what his good friends have deserved at the hands of fortune that she sends them to prison thither.

Guil. Prison, my lord!
Ham. Denmark's a prison.
Ros. Then is the world one.
Ham. A goodly one; in which there are many confines, wards, and dungeons; Denmark being one o' the worst.
Ros. We think not so, my lord.

Rosencrantz, who is more logical-minded than his companion, treats Hamlet's observation that Denmark is a prison as a false proposition by inferring from it the any-proposition, "Then is the world one." Hamlet, pleased with the inference, which seems to him to be the legitimate deduction from a true proposition, proceeds to dilate upon it and forces him to the flat statement that he thinks that the proposition is false. Thereupon Hamlet shows the incompetence of this reply by pointing out that such a judgment has only a subjective validity. It is true or false independently of objective standards, and is not to be taken, if false, as a basis for the deduction of any proposition.

Ham. Why, then 'tis none to you: for there is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so. To me it is a prison.

When a man swears, he asserts a false proposition, usually in simple and direct terms. He infers from it an any-proposition which he dresses in language as grotesque as his taste may dictate. The more grotesque the any-proposition, the more poetic the swearing and the stronger hold it takes upon the imagination—witness Rabelais, "May I never be hang'd, if 'twas not a Comical Sight." The particular choice of verbs for the asserted false proposition determines the flavor of the swearing, whether it be good or bad, for the oaths of the roughneck and the oaths of the devotee are fre-

quently identical in their sense. The palpable absurdity of the inferred any-proposition acts upon the mind of the hearer as evidence that the first-asserted false proposition is false indeed. The wide prevalence of this sort of thinking, both in the higher atmosphere of poetry and in the common swearing of the streets, seems to indicate that such an order in the presentation of ideas gives vigor to conviction and provides a medium for the exercise of strong language.

It is therefore no paradox, that strong language is unnecessary for the use of him who would argue that a false proposition in our actual thinking process does imply any proposition. The language of the streets proves his contention. And the author of the present paper, as far as the foregoing is concerned, appears to be in what Emerson has somewhere described as the false position of defending the obvious. But valid conclusions rest ultimately on such an appeal; and it may now be noted that logic, if it is the science which deals with the actual objective properties of actual thoughts, the relations between them, and with the mechanism and procedure of their action, is a different thing from the deductive science of mathematical logic or logistic which deals with defined and frequently imaginary things without questioning behind the definition. Logisticians have been known to boast that their conclusions would still be true if there were no world at all or only a world with no thinking intelligence in it.

All science and indeed all human activity needs logic. It is impossible even to go from the soup through the rest of the dinner without frequently taking advantage of the laws, or principles, or whatever else it is that constitutes the science, of logic. And logic in some sense is an objective or natural science after all. A given proposition implies a certain other proposition or it does not. Given the first proposition, a perceiving person can infer the second or he can not. The facts of the science are no more debatable than the facts of physical science, yet logic, among all the sciences, is unique. For all of them it is the *science of procedure*. And methodology is the science of scientific procedure.

No science can get along without logic; and, as each science has its special subject-matter, so, in many cases, it has also its "special logic." This "special logic" is another or secondary science and has for its subject-matter highly-specialized, exactly-defined, imaginary things, such as entropy, molecular weight, chemical affinity, specific heat, rigid implication, vector quantities, the square root of minus one, *etc., etc.* But these secondary and deductive sciences are not branches of logic properly so-called; they are not sciences of procedure, but, as far as their intent and application are concerned, are part of the actual procedure itself.

In their intent these secondary deductive sciences provide tools and means for the operation of the more concrete and perfectly objective natural sciences. And it is without doubt this demand on the part of the concrete sciences for tools which has given rise to the existence of the secondary sciences—as is manifest in the fact that geometry was born in ancient Egypt, called into existence by the necessity of re-surveying the land after the subsidence of the annual Nile floods. These secondary sciences, however, are after all sciences which deal with the properties of things, though *defined* things, and they have a fascination and lure for their devotees which lead them on to define other things more or less similar to the original objects of their study and to delve into the properties of these new things—even though this study has now no longer any value as part of the procedure of the primary science. In this way the secondary sciences often advance farther or in other directions than the primary sciences which have called them into existence, and often they run into blind alleys, and occasionally they lag behind. There are frequently gaps in the one and waste places in the others. Present mathematics has developments which will surely prove to be tools for the elucidation of some of the recent discoveries of physics. Clerk Maxwell, when he undertook the study of vortices, found ready for his hand the mathematical equipment of his procedure.

No branch of human endeavor needs logic more than philosophy. While the physical sciences can, if need be, naïvely proceed about their business, making only unconscious use of logic—as unconscious as the man who wields a pick—the conscious and critical use of logic is as necessary for a philosopher as the habit of accurate observation is for the man who works in a laboratory. In a very general sense the aim of philosophy seems to be the examination of the purport and significance, the connection and purpose of things. The physical and the more recent psychological sciences have never really usurped any part of the territory of philosophy, and they never can. The student of physics who picked up *Paradise Lost*, read for a few minutes, and threw down the book with the question, "What does it prove?" was more of a philosopher than he would willingly admit. Philosophy will always be concerned with the significance of the concrete sciences and with the relation of the knowledge which they produce to knowledge of other kinds which is derived from other sources. Thus, one of the problems of metaphysics is the relation between the knowledge derived from the concrete science of physics and that derived from the deductive science of mathematics. And meta-logic will have to discuss the purport of logic, its significance, and relevance, and the relation, if any, of

this concrete primary science to the secondary deductive science of mathematical logic or logistic. The subject of the present paper, then, is a meta-logical one. If it succeeds merely in putting the question its purpose will have been accomplished.

When the mathematical logician boasts that his science is one which studies the properties of defined things similar to those which occur in the thinking process but not having any necessary connection with them, he seems to me to talk like a man whose life is dedicated to the study of the Phoenix or the Basilisk. Perhaps I misunderstand; and this paper, after all, is only a plea for enlightenment. James Stuart Mill said that genius is the ability to perceive remote connections and gave basis for an excellent definition of philosophy—as *the study of relevance and of purport.* If logistic is really a part of philosophy, it would seem that the logisticians might give us a discussion of the relevance of mathematical logic. The significance of a symbolistic shorthand representation of a train of thinking is plain enough. What of the volumes of theorems derived by developing the defined properties of symbols? What of this science that C. I. Lewis has shown to be only a game, played according to rules, with quids and with quods? Strong language puts the question forcefully. And a discussion of it by the logisticians would be a contribution to meta-logic.

TENNEY L. DAVIS.

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SOCIETIES

THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE WESTERN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

WITH its annual meeting, on April 16 and 17, at the University of Wisconsin, the Western Philosophical Association brought to a strikingly successful close the twentieth year of its history. The attendance, including instructors, assistants, and graduate students from neighboring institutions, was the largest in years; the discussion was thoroughly fresh and lively and the fellowship both genuine and spirited. The pleasure and the profit of the meetings were both enhanced in no small measure through the thoughtful arrangements made by the local department of philosophy and through the kindness of the Beta Theta Pi fraternity in placing its Lodge at the disposal of the visiting members, thus enabling them to live in common during their stay in Madison.

Under the new name of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association, and in eager cooperation with the Eastern Division, the organization now seeks a further expansion of its usefulness. The possibilities inherent in joint undertakings were promisingly augured in the business meeting. Following a resolution by which a committee was instructed to cooperate with a committee of the Eastern Division in arranging for a joint meeting which, with invitations to other American and to foreign philosophical societies, might possibly be given the character of a philosophical congress, the announcement was made that Mrs. Carus had generously made the offer of an honorarium, in memory of Dr. Paul Carus, for a course of lectures to be given on the occasion of the first joint meeting of the Divisions.

The presidential address by Professor Norman Wilde was delivered immediately after the annual dinner on Friday evening. Selecting as his topic, "The Attack on the State," President Wilde presented a critique, both acute and constructive, of recent pluralistic theories, and a defense of the view that political sovereignty must be interpreted as very genuinely supreme and unitary.

A noteworthy feature of the meeting was the informal session or gathering held on Saturday afternoon in the living room of the Beta Theta Pi Lodge. Various matters of common interest were considered. The greater part of the afternoon, however, was taken up by discussions of various attempts now being made or projected by American colleges and universities to provide students with a twentieth century *Weltanschauung*, with an intelligent view of the physical and the social environment in which modern life is carried on, or with such knowledge as forms an indispensable prerequisite for any serious study of metaphysics. The discussion was initiated by a paper which Professor Gregory D. Walcott presented on "A New Content Course in Philosophy."[1] The aim of the course which Professor Walcott described and which he is this year giving in Hamline University is to furnish a cross-sectional view of the world as this is represented by the various sciences of to-day. Through the series of books published by Henry Holt & Company as "The Home University Library of Modern Knowledge," the students are introduced to some fifteen or twenty sciences in the course of the year. Only the more general and important points are stressed, and these are brought into as complete and vital relations as possible, the whole constituting a sort of neo-Positivistic or neo-Synthetic evolutionary philosophy. For next year Professor Walcott is planning a companion course on "A Philosophical Survey of Human Culture."

[1] To be published in full in a later issue of this JOURNAL.

The most significant item of business transacted was the adoption, with certain minor changes, of a report presented by Professor Alexander, Chairman of the Committee on the Federation of Philosophical Associations. As amended and adopted, the report reads as follows:

"The Committee of the Western Philosophical Association, continued for the purpose of carrying forward negotiations looking to the federation of this Association with the American and the Southern Philosophical Associations, report as follows:

"1. While some members of the Southern Philosophical Association have indicated interest in the proposals made, no definite response has as yet been received.

"2. At the meeting of the American Philosophical Association held in Ithaca, December 30 and 31, 1919, the following amendment to Article I., Section 1, of its constitution, was unanimously passed:

" 'The name of this organization shall be the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association.'

"Further, it was moved and carried that the matter of closer association between the Eastern, Western and Southern Associations be referred to the Committee on Organization and Attendance (Professor Tufts, chairman); and it was suggested that in choosing a place of meeting for next year (1920) a joint meeting with the Western branch be considered.

"3. In view of the action of the American Philosophical Association, this committee recommends the following amendment and resolution:

"I. The name of this association shall be the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association.

"II. The members of this Association, in changing its name, express their cordial appreciation of the courtesy of the members of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association, and the hope that the change of name may be the foretoken of a more intimate association of the memberships of the two Divisions.

"4. The committee further recommend:

"(*a*) That the matter of securing a joint meeting be continued with a committee appointed for this purpose, to act in consultation with the committee similarly empowered by the Eastern Division.

"(*b*) That the members of the Western Division express their hope that the first joint meeting, or congress, may be arranged to be held in the first or second week of September, 1921, on the campus of some university of the eastern states.

"(*c*) That the Western Division believe that the joint meeting should be made the occasion for the extending of an invitation to

some American philosopher to deliver there a series of not less than five lectures upon some philosophical topic, the lecturer to be chosen by the committee organizing the programme.

"(*d*) That they also suggest the desirability of inviting the presence of delegates from other philosophical societies, American or foreign, thus giving the meeting the character of a philosophical congress."

The existing committee on Federation was appointed as the committee mentioned in paragraph four of the above report. In response to a letter from President Perry, of the Eastern Division, the secretary was authorized to communicate to Professor Armstrong, chairman of a committee of the Eastern Division having in charge matters relating to the sending of representatives to the approaching international philosophical gathering at Oxford, our desire that the representatives selected bear the credentials of the Western Division as well. In acceptance of an invitation from the University of Chicago, it was resolved to hold the next annual meeting of the Division at that institution. The generous offer by Mrs. Paul Carus of a honorarium, in memory of Dr. Paul Carus, for a course of lectures to be given at the first joint meeting with the Eastern Division, was enthusiastically accepted and the secretary was instructed to convey to Mrs. Carus the deep appreciation of the Division. Resolutions of thanks were offered also to the University of Wisconsin, its Department of Philosophy, and the local Beta Theta Pi fraternity for their splendid hospitality to the members and visiting friends of the Association.

The following persons were elected to membership in the Division: Albert R. Chandler, H. E. Cunningham, D. S. Robinson, A. J. Schneeweiss, Ella Stokes, and W. C. Swabey.

The officers elected for the coming year were: *President,* E. L. Hinman; *Vice-president,* W. L. Raub; *Secretary-Treasurer,* E. L. Schaub; *Members of the Executive Committee,* R. C. Lodge, A. W. Moore, M. C. Otto, J. D. Stoops.

The treasurer's report indicated the possession of forty war savings stamps, in addition to balances in the checking and in the savings accounts, respectively, of $82.94 and $69.44.

The papers read at the meeting were as follows:

The Logical Status of Elementary and Reflective Judgments: R. C. Lodge.

(Published in full in this Journal, Vol. XVII., pp. 214–220.)

Some Lingering Misconceptions of Instrumentalism: A. W. Moore.

The justification of a discussion under this heading is found in

the fact that recent important literature revives certain misconceptions of instrumentalism, which a year ago one would have said had been finally disposed of. These misconceptions arise from unauthorized extensions of the meaning of the term "instrumental." In all authorized versions of instrumentalism the term refers to the instrumental character of *reflective,* inferential consciousness. In the misconceptions it is made to apply to *all* consciousness with the result that *immediate* experience to which reflection is instrumental is reduced to mere physical motion, and when applied to values the misconceptions result in the absurdity, which the perpetrator of the misconstruction delights to point out, of making all values instrumental to a process which is devoid of value.

References to repeated explicit statements by instrumentalists of what they mean by "immediate experience" show how unwarranted this misuse of the term instrumental is and how grotesque the notion that instrumentalism has no place for the values of appreciation, contemplation and adoration which are precisely the things to which, in instrumental doctrine, *reflective* consciousness is instrumental.

Some of the sources of the misconceptions are : (1) The term "instrumentalism" which as an "ism" is, with some justification, taken to mean a universal character; (2) the habit common to all of us of thinking and talking of consciousness in *cognitive* terms; (3) failure to note that the biology to which instrumentalists appeal is a glorified biology loaded with all the conscious values—social, æsthetic and religious—of which it is stripped by those who find it a stumbling-block; (4) the confusion of the question of the *nature* and function of reflective consciousness with the irrelevant psychological matter of the division and specialization of interest.

A Sociological Theory of Knowledge: E. L. Schaub.

Though presenting itself as integral, experience likewise manifests perplexing antitheses, both in fact and in worth, in the realm of cognition no less than in those of feeling and volition. Hence distinctions such as those of opinion and knowledge, perception and conception, sense data and categories.

I. *Historical Setting.*—Early empiricism and rationalism were succeeded by Kant's endeavor to show that the various factors of experience must be interpreted as abstractions from a concrete whole, not as separate entities. This led to idealistic theories of knowledge, for which experience is an indissoluble synthesis of existence and meaning. But Kant inextricably combines with the above an attempt to show how experience comes into being. This paved the way for genetic doctrines: empiricism; apriorism; Spencer's media-

tory view; James's explanation of classificatory, logical and mathematical relations as due to spontaneous variations; Bergson's evolutionary apriorism. To safeguard the unique and authoritative character of concepts and categories (as emphasized by apriorism) while yet tracing them to specific origins verifiable by scientific investigation (as attempted by empiricism) is the aim of Durkheim.

II. *Durkheim's Theory of Knowledge.*—Cognitive experience exhibits two mutually irreducible sorts of elements: (1) Sensations, images and general ideas, dependent upon the organism and characterized by flux, subjectivity, and a status merely of *fact,* not of *right.* (2) Concepts, and the most general of the concepts, categories, the permanent to which the variable is related in the act of thinking; characterized by immutability, impersonality, universality, communicability, and authoritativeness. Their origin is the collective mind, which is distinct from individual minds and is *sui generis.* The genesis of the concepts or categories of class, of the hierarchical mode of classification, of totality, space, time, force, cause, and contradiction.

Concepts and categories afford the first intuition of a realm of truth—an order characterized by impersonality, stability, and social acceptance. No category or system of concepts more than approximates to objective validity; yet all are more than merely individual and many are more than merely instrumental or even social in the narrow sense of the term.

III. *Critique.*—The difficulties center about the cleavage between the individual and the collective minds and about the intellectualism which regards minds as consisting of representations. Inadequate recognition of the social and logical aspects of sense perception and of other processes classed as individual; of the extent to which concepts and categories are rooted in instincts; of difficulties involved in the fact that, as compared with social organization, categories are practically, if not absolutely, stable, and connected with the further fact that classification seldom occurs in connection with the realm of spirits and of the beyond in spite of the fact that these are matters of focal significance to the primitive mind. Contradiction between Durkheim's method and his principles. The categories of his description presuppose the categories. Given (1) the characteristics now conceded by numerous psychologists as original, (2) a high degree of plasticity on the part of human nature, and (3) interrelationships with minds as well as with inert objects, and one may account satisfactorily for the rational experience which individuals come to enjoy. Epistemology should take into consideration the relation of mind to mind along with that of mind to its objects.

The Chief Assumptions of Democracy: R. W. SELLARS.

It is not difficult nowadays to pick up books and essays very critical of democracy. In these criticisms we clearly find the swing of the pendulum from a naïve romanticism which filled the democratic movement in its early days. But what we need to-day is an effective idealism which is full of knowledge of actual conditions and social forces.

In its deepest sense, democracy signifies the conviction that every human being deserves respect and consideration. This respect is the ferment which democracy introduces into society. In religious language, the postulate of democracy is, that all men are brethren and that God is the common father. The eighteenth century proclaimed its democratic perceptions in the doctrine of inalienable rights.

But these guiding ideas have been largely individualistic. What have been the actual principles at work in our institutional life? First of all, we must remember that the democratic movement is the social reality. And the democratic movement has faced in two directions. It has denied the type of social organization previously dominant and it has suggested principles of its own. Besides there has always been a right and a left wing to the movement. We, in America, have been far more familiar with the right, liberal wing than with the left, radical wing.

The three important aspects of society are the political, the economic and the social. In each of these dimensions the assumptions of society have varied far more than we ordinarily realize. The first attitude of democracy was individualistic and defensive. It stressed rights rather than creation. It was not very constructive or forward-looking. This comes out in such phrases as the "consent of the governed" and "individual rights." In the economic sphere, we have *laissez-faire* rather than group-planning. In social affairs, imitation and convention rather than activity and independence of spirit.

A new spirit seems now abroad, and democracy is more aware of actual conditions and more purposive. The good life is the goal being set, and the social conditions favoring its approximation are being carefully scrutinized. It is clear, then, that the assumptions of democracy change radically from age to age.

The Ethical Import of Nationalism: E. L. HINMAN.

Recognizing the force of nationalism in modern days, the question presses concerning its philosophical interpretation. Urged that one's definition of the essence of nationalism will depend upon his philosophy; that nationalism as conceived in the context of a realistic philosophy is a terrific force for evil, but that as leavened by the

spirit of a broad idealism it is one of the most valuable of constructive influences. This influence should be seized upon and guided by the representatives of philosophy. But it has been exploited hitherto chiefly by the historians, whose discernment of the vital ideals of civilization has been inadequate. And the result has been tragic.

Analysis of Professor Ramsay Muir's conception. Inadequate—tends to level downwards. Prevalence of cruder and more realistic elements in popular nationalism and jingoism. Relevancy of strictures by Veblen and Krehbiel. But these outrage nationalism rather than interpret it. Must engage with and express higher idealism of nationalistic consciousness. Study of Mazzini, as pointing the way to this service.

The Concept of State Power: G. H. SABINE.

The state has traditionally been conceived for juristic purposes as a unified power, or legal personality, having underived, and possibly unlimited, right to issue commands to its subjects or political inferiors. Such commands of a political superior are law, and law derives its binding force from the political superiority of the will which issues it.

This conception is derived historically from the political conditions which prevailed in the period which brought the state into existence. The state was created by the rise of royal power to a position of dominance over the feudal nobility or certain corporations within the kingdom and of independence as against the Church and the Holy Roman Empire. Sovereign power meant in the first instance the personal power of the king to make and enforce law against all persons or associations within his domain. Such power was not incorrectly described as underived, unified, and absolute.

The rise of constitutional monarchy brought into being the doctrine that this absolute power inheres not in the king, but in the people, but the principle that absolute power is the source of law remained unchanged. But the concept now lacked juristic clarity because the people are not an organized law-making institution. With the growth of constitutional limitations, the law-making power of the state ceased to be concentrated in any specific agency of the government and the attempts of political science to indicate the body in which sovereign power resides were futile. The federal states presented especially complex examples of political organization. The rationalistic method of political science, however, clung to the belief that certain essential powers of the state might be derived by a logical elaboration of the concept of the state's power, and the political tendency toward centralization of authority strengthened this belief.

In fact, however, political practise does not justify the theory that any specific powers are essential to the state nor is there much unity in the powers which a given state exercises. Modern states have taken over a varied assortment of activities having no obvious unity beyond the fact that they are carried on by agencies of government. Moreover, the powers exercised by the state do not represent any specific public interest, since public interest may be just as strong in many activities conducted by private agencies. It is a question of policy whether a socially important activity can best be conducted by the one means or the other. In either case, however, the activity is protected and regulated by law.

The prevailing tendency of constitutional government has been to make every agency of government subject to law and with some exceptions such agencies are legally responsible for their actions as fully as private persons or corporations. This indicates the complete inappropriateness of defining law as the will of the state embodied in commands to political inferiors.

International Punishment: A. P. BROGAN.

There is an almost unworked field in the study of international punishment. The task of philosophy here is to formulate the methods, principles, and rules for the determination of justice in the punishment of nations.

This study should not be condemned as self-contradictory on the argument that punishment originally occurs only within one group. Men are now seeking for just ways of dealing with wrong-doing between nations. This is our problem, call it what you will.

If philosophy is to be helpful for this problem, it must be philosophy as the study of values rather than as metaphysics or epistemology or theology. Discussions about determinism, about the general will, about the absolute, would not benefit our problem even if agreement could be reached; and agreement can not be reached.

What we need is a common platform for ethical investigation. The essentials of this platform (teleology, universalism, meliorism, and experimentalism) could quickly be secured by serious cooperation. The questions about which thinkers are likely to remain in essential disagreement are those parts of ethical theory not necessary as foundations for our study.

On this common platform a theory of international ethics must be elaborated, as the guide and standard for international law and for international associations. A principal part of this ethics will be the justice of international punishment.

The determination of right and justice in this connection is a

problem for the student of ethical philosophy. But it would be folly for the philosopher to pretend to deal with the entire problem of international punishment. There is need of specialization on the part of the philosopher, and there is equal need of cooperation with the students of law, government, history, social psychology, and similar fields. The task of the philosopher is to study the values involved.

A Neglected Aspect of Hume's Ethical Theory: F. C. SHARP.

Hume finds the source of the moral judgment in the affective side of man's nature. The ethicists of the rationalistic school have always asserted that the logical consequence of such a view is ethical subjectivism. Many of the members of the affectivistic school, such as A. E. Taylor and Westermarck, freely admit the truth of this contention.

The paper attempts to show how Hume, in defending his theory against certain objections (which, however, had nothing to do with subjectivism) was led to recognize that the moral judgment is something more than an expression of the passing feelings of the moment. The moral judgment, he saw, does not represent the feelings aroused in me by the fact that one of the parties of the situation happens to be an acquaintance, a friend, or myself; that I happen to have witnessed the incident, or that the incident took place yesterday instead of two thousand years ago. The moral judgment represents my feelings with regard to conduct when I have abstracted from my accidental relations to the parties concerned; it is the voice of the impersonal or (somewhat less accurately) the impartial spectator.

When this fact is recognized, the distinction made in every-day life between "correct" and "incorrect" moral judgments is at once justified. For judgments in which I do not succeed in taking the impersonal attitude are not moral judgments in the proper sense of the term, and can therefore only be called "incorrect," or, better, invalid. Hume never really saw the bearing of these facts upon the general problem of the existence of a universally valid moral code. The great majority of later ethicists have ignored the facts themselves completely. They are, however, of the first importance in discussing the question: What are the causes of the variations in moral judgments? Such a discussion may perhaps lead to the conclusion that when these invalid members are removed from the system of our moral judgments the remainder will form a single harmonious code which will thus represent the code of the entire race. If so we shall have an ethical theory based upon desires and their attendant feelings which is justified in asserting the existence of a moral code valid for mankind as a whole.

A Reversal of Perspective in Ethical Theory: H. W. STUART.

(To be published in full in an early number of the *Philosophical Review.*)

The Basis of Human Association: H. W. WRIGHT.[2]

The basis of human association is personal communication carried on through discussion, cooperation and emotional concord. Discussion is made possible by the fact that the ends which men choose among are commonly intelligible. An end is a permanent possibility of realization for a subject or self; such a self is essentially social, for it maintains its personal identity by opposing to the shifting play of animal sentience an order of definable objects that is assumed to be real for all other selves as well. Cooperation depends upon the fact that the satisfaction which human individuals seek from the realization of objects as ends is a function of their comprehensiveness, and this, since it is based upon their intelligible character, is assumed to hold for all men equally. The possibility of an agreement in purpose among men is therefore created, an agreement which is favored by the fact that the more comprehensive ends are those which include in their scope the interests of others as well as the self. Emotional concord is made possible by the fact that the feelings which accompany and result from human action spring from the pursuit of commonly intelligible ends concerning whose value there is general agreement. The "Kingdom of Ends" is by nature a social kingdom; the single self in pursuit of an intelligently considered and deliberately chosen end involves the society of selves participating in the realization of common ends. Personal communication as a process has three essential characteristics: first, it is governed by ends that are social and imply the community of selves; second, it gives fullest opportunity for the exercise of individual initiative and inventiveness in the attainment of ends whose value is generally appreciated; and third, it insures from the intercourse of free persons the discovery of new values in the discharge of our common social task.

Group Participation as the Sociological Principle par Excellence: J. E. BOODIN.

It has been customary to explain social evolution and social conduct in terms of certain factors or causes, such as the physical factors, race, instinct, population, custom, *etc.* The thesis of this paper is a reversal of the ordinary method. It is, that instead of trying to account for the group by certain factors, we must understand the

[2] To be published in full in a later issue of this JOURNAL.

factors in terms of the group—its cumulative tradition and creative life. The real causes or motives must be found in the life history of the individual, as woven into the social network of relations at a specific cross-section of the history of the group. We can not say that this particular condition of the environment or this particular tendency effected such and such results, but we must take account of this condition or tendency as part of an organization of life interests with its social pressure, system of beliefs and scale of values. The particular factors must be regarded as instruments, conditions, raw material for social construction. The process, in other words, must be regarded, not as a mechanical but as a teleological process—the factors having meaning and efficiency only as they enter into the creative synthesis of group realization. We must take account of group participation, not as a mere effect, but as an independent variable, and for sociology the most significant variable. We find that other factors may vary and yet group relations remain the same. And on the other hand we find that group relations may vary while other factors remain the same.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge. A. N. WHITEHEAD. Cambridge University Press. 1919. Pp. xii + 200.

This is a book of real importance, but it is not a book for everybody. There are pages filled with definitions of queer technical terms, and there is no index, but that is not what makes it hard reading. The difficulty lies in the thought. You need some mathematical training to read the book, and you need some acquaintance with the previous writings of the author, or the related writings of Mr. Bertrand Russell. But far more than these, you need a sense of the whole movement of modern physical science, and an imagination undaunted by four-dimensional manifolds interweaving with other four-dimensional manifolds. In short, we have a book here which ought to be read by every philosophy student interested in metaphysics or in the philosophy of nature, but a book which most students of philosophy are not competent to read.

The subject of the enquiry is stated to be "geometry as a physical science," or "how is space rooted in experience?" And its fundamental thesis is that the verifiable data of physical science

extend temporally as well as spatially. All nature can, and indeed must, be analyzed into a complex of time-filling and space-filling events. It is therefore assumed that certain so-called "mathematical" objects, such as points of space and instants of time, do not exist. Or rather, proof is advanced that we can get along without assuming that they exist, and can still have a mathematics applicable to nature. Professor Whitehead does not argue that points and instants are unperceivable and therefore unreal. His argument takes the more effective form of establishing that points and instants are introduced only in a certain type of analysis of nature, which analysis is then shown to be inadequate. "We can not express the facts of nature as an aggregate of individual facts at points and at instants" (p. 24). Thus it happens that no addition of points together will produce a length; if you start with points, lengths must be introduced as something additional. But you could get the equivalent of points out of lengths by a suitable construction in the reverse direction.

The method of avoiding the assumption of points and instants is not so much debated in the present book, as it is assumed to be valid and then developed; the discussions which occur here of this "method of extensive abstraction" are concerned with the details of technique. The method consists essentially in taking the class of all the space-time volumes that would include a certain supposed point at an instant, and do not all include any other point or instant, arranging these in approximation series that are mutually equivalent in that they all, as they grow smaller and smaller, approximate towards the supposed point, and then taking the set of such equivalent series as a substitute for the supposed instantaneous point. It is somewhat as if, to use an over-simplified example, one took the series of all circles having their center-point in common as being an equivalent for the center itself. One would then translate geometry into a form that omitted the mention of points: instead of saying "the line passes through this point," one would say "the line cuts all these circular areas." Each circle has a finite area; the center-point has no finite area. But there is a unique one-one relation between the set of circles and their common center. So we can employ a class of areas as a sort of substitute for the non-area which is their limit; and thus simplify metaphysically, by being able to say that all space-things have areas. But of course, in the ways in which these space-things are put together there is a great increase of complexity, especially since lines and areas must next be translated into sets of volumes, and so on. Our motive here is obviously not a pragmatic search for economy of thought, but a meta-

physical ideal of economy of assumption, as regards the introduction of new sorts of irreducible metaphysical entities.

Professor Whitehead calls attention to an analogy with the differential calculus. There is no physical meaning to a velocity at an instant. Yet we can study the average velocity over three seconds, over two seconds, over one second, over half a second, *etc.*, and we can then infer that, at the instant, a certain number would represent with great precision the velocity of the body at that instant. The number is more precise than the values of the separate members of the series from which it came, since the velocity for a second is often only an average of various velocities during parts of the second. Yet the velocity at an instant is, nevertheless, no velocity at all; a perfectly instantaneous photograph would not show the body in motion. The formerly employed explanation was that the velocity in question was over an infinitesimal time; and then we had metaphysical problems about what were these "ghosts of vanished quantities." But there are no infinitesimals. The "velocity at an instant" is not a velocity, though it is the limit of a series of velocities over diminishing finite times. We could use the set of all such series, equivalent in that they are all diminishing towards the same instant, as the "velocity at the instant," but since they all have the same number which is their limit as series, this number, though lying outside of each and all these equivalent series, may be used as answering the same purpose, when we are calculating the course of behavior of a body. That is to say, the numbers have among them one number which is the limit of the series of numbers representing the velocities, though the velocities themselves do not have a limit which is a velocity. If we were dealing with velocities in the concrete, the only equivalent we could give for a velocity at an instant would be the entire set of series of actual velocities approximating to it. This is what we have to do when analogously we seek existent substitutes for non-existent "mathematical" points.

Certain difficulties seem still to lurk in the method. For instance, the approximation series must be infinite. In our series of concentric circles there is no circle that does not have within it a still smaller circle. But an actual infinite is no less inexperienceable, unverifiable, than is a mathematical point. There is something here, in any case, that can be reached only by thought. Moreover, in the present discussion at least, the areas and volumes seem to be assumed to be sharply bounded, without that penumbra of vagueness which blurs the outlines of every experienced figure. When we recall that such a penumbra of vagueness must itself have indefinite boundaries, and so on, then we see that, no matter how we handle these figures,

we use a thought that far outruns the verifiable. How complicated does the equality of two lengths become, when neither length begins or ends in a point! Wonderfully ingenious this theory will have to be—till we begin to wonder whether the game is not being made endlessly intricate for no deeper reason than to show the skill of the player?

But there are other topics in Professor Whitehead's book, and we can not exhaust any one of them here. Perhaps the most central discussion is one concerning the contrast of events and objects. What relation does the analysis of the world into a stream of events have to the ordinary analysis into objects, whether perceived physical things, such as houses and trees, or scientific objects, such as electrons? The answer is naturally complex. The two sorts of analysis overlap, yet neither is exhaustive. Let us first quote some relevant passages. "Events are essentially elements of actuality" (p. 61); they "can never happen again;" "events never change," though they give place to other events; "the irrevocableness of the past is the unchangeability of events." The most fundamental relation among events is that of inclusion-exclusion, or part-whole. Objects, on the contrary, do happen again; they reappear; they are correlated with the physical act of recognition. Indeed, Professor Whitehead concludes that they are not so much permanent in time as out of time altogether. What is in time is the set of events correlated with a given object. Yet also, though objects are out of time and space, they are, nevertheless that which has possibilities, that is to say, has potentialities. "Whenever the concept of possibility can apply to a natural element, that element is an object" (p. 64). As regards part-whole relations, "it is an error to ascribe parts to objects," either temporal, as if the table today were part of the total table, the table to-morrow another part; or spatial, as if the leg of the table were part of the table. The having spatial and temporal parts is peculiar to events. "Time and space, which are entirely actual and devoid of any tincture of possibility, are to be sought for among the relations of events." "The chief confusion between objects and events is conveyed in the prejudice that an object can only be in one place at a time. That is a fundamental property of events" (p. 65). "The continuity of nature is to be found in events, the atomic properties of nature reside in objects" (p. 66).

The term "event" lays emphasis on the time-covering character of the actually existent. Nevertheless, this tapestry of events, stretching away into past and future, absolutely actual, related only by relations of inclusion-exclusion, is almost the antithesis of tem-

porality. Physicists and philosophers are alike in their deep-seated desire to view the world "under the aspect of eternity." Professor Whitehead has tried to avoid such a tendency by making references to action and creative advance. But somehow the creative flow of the present becomes superficial in the course of the analysis, becomes a chance shadow that flits across the fixed tapestry of events. As physicist you abstract; true enough, but Professor Whitehead's own inquiry is precisely this, How may we bring physics into closer contact with natural fact? Now any easy device of letting time slip out of the picture is not masterly; and time includes not merely temporal extensity, but also the actuality of change. Perchance we philosophers pride ourselves on eternity because we can not bring our feeble minds to think squarely and heartily in terms of time, in terms of this treacherous, ever-slipping ever-advancing movement, that seems the very stuff out of which our lives are made; can not bring ourselves to think in terms of potentialities, of possible occurrences and things unborn, of hopes and uncertainties and the open road. "To realize the unimportance of time," says Mr. Bertrand Russell, "is the gate of wisdom." Yes, of a certain moral wisdom, perhaps; but why *these* moral judgments introduced into the consideration of the world as it seems to be? Even M. Bergson, with all his lip-service to change, turns for the essence of mind to memory, to memory which gives us the now silent panorama of the past; and for his ideal of God, to an ideal Vision, which like Professor Royce's Absolute, might command all time at once, in one world-inclusive moment. Let us not attribute this tendency to the nature of intellect, or to the spatializing of time. No, these are at most only symptoms. The fault, if it be a fault, lies in our fear and bewilderment before this dizzy, whirling, vanishing world as it is.

There is a clarifying virtue in the very sharpness of Professor Whitehead's distinctions between the world as a set of events, and the same world as various different sets of things, making no one analysis exhaustive of all aspects, and apportioning certain concepts to one analysis, certain to another. This is true, even though the distinctions first made may not prove finally tenable. The apportioning of time to events and timelessness to things is a case in point. So also is it with the ascription of possibility to things. It would be better perhaps, though more commonplace and hence less suggestive, to have said that the temporal characters prominent in things are different from the temporal characters prominent in events, though things be considered as merely certain systems of events. It would be better to say that you can talk, in one sense, of a possible event, but not of an event's having possibilities, for only things have potentialities. Since we recognize a thing, an ob-

ject, as the same in new situations, it has, in this respect, characters similar to universals. So it becomes easy to generalize, and say of things what we ordinarily say of universals, that they are timeless and have no parts. But perhaps it would be better not to stretch the analogy too far. Professor Whitehead's paradoxes are largely verbal, and behind them lie some really significant distinctions, distinctions which it would be a pity to lose in any verbal quarrel or novel convention about language usages.

One of the most baffling problems of distinguishing between the verbal or conventional and the real is presented by the recent scientific theory of relativity. Professor Whitehead's entire work has been at every step influenced by these theories, and his own specific discussions of Einstein and of the curious arbitrariness of selecting light signals as the basic way of determining simultaneities, are among the best philosophical criticisms of relativity that have yet appeared. Professor Whitehead does not discuss the generalized relativity theory, but introduces in his own geometry Euclidean and continuity postulates. Also he does not make it clear, any more than does Einstein himself, precisely how the famous Newtonian argument for absolute space, from the phenomena of rotation, is answered by the relativist.

Professor Whitehead's own analysis would apparently and naturally lead him—though here we depart somewhat from his specific statements and deal with what seem to be unnoted implications—to a distinction between the space of events and the space of things—or rather, spaces of things, for not only are there various sorts of objects, but confining ourselves, for the moment, to ordinary physical objects, there are, if we consider space to be nothing but a relation between objects, different spaces for different sets of objects, as Professor Whitehead himself remarks, and an object which is standing still in one space is moving in another. Apparently, the space of events, or space-time of events, is one aspect of the events themselves, namely their extensity. According to Professor Whitehead, it constitutes an all-inclusive plenum, and if we limit ourselves strictly to events, the only possible geometry would seem to be a sort of "analysis situs" of inclusion-exclusion, curiously reminiscent of Aristotle's long-neglected theory that space is essentially a relationship of container and contained. It would seem, however, that without introducing objects, this space-time of events could not have any metrical properties, such as lengths. Fixity of units of length would involve recognition of sameness. The event-manifold is a "jelly-fish world," where no units are suggested, for there are no rigid bodies. But neither would there be simultaneity of remote events. The supposition that there would be simultaneity, and

hence "moments of time," is apparently tacitly introduced by Professor Whitehead. Yet the interconnection of simultaneity and units of length is one of the most central theses of the theory of relativity. The metrical structure is something new, independent, external, laid down over the manifold of events and fitting it somewhat loosely.

The Bergsonians inform us that needs of action have impelled us to try to fixate the fluidity of events by superimposing rigid mathematical forms. The situation seems nowadays almost the reverse: we are trying to measure given extensities with india-rubber yardsticks. These yardsticks are still comparable, since they vary according to law; but the law is their own law, and not one necessitated by the events to be measured. I measure a moving train, and discover it has "become shorter" as it moved. The passenger on the train replies that the train is just as it has always been, the discrepancy originated through my laying my measuring-tape on the front end of the train just a moment before I laid it on the back. Simultaneity and length are thus curiously interwoven by the relativity theory, but both are relative and comparative, and are superimposed on an extensity which is somehow absolute. A man in Washington, D. C., may quarrel over the telephone with a man in St. Louis, one declaring it is eleven o'clock, and the other that it is ten o'clock. Obviously, they are quarreling about the same time, and their quarrel is a verbal one concerning what name they are going to call "it" by. But the verbal quarrel is not purely verbal; it is based on a difference, not in the identity of the moment of time under dispute, but in the standard of comparison. Just so, the train has a certain absolute extensity. Otherwise there would be no question raised. But the instant there is an attempt to compare this extensity with other extensities, we have a difference of standards of comparison on our hands. There is not merely the obvious arbitrariness due to conventionality in selecting a particular yardstick; and not merely an idealization which creates for us a perfect "unchanging" Dr. Jekyll of a yardstick, despite the Mr. Hyde characteristics of actual physical yardsticks, infected as they are with what Professor Whitehead calls the "incurable vagueness" of all physical objects, plus some additional faults peculiar to yardsticks; but in addition, the very process of measuring involves new complications, so that there is more than one result possible even where you measure the same thing with the same yardstick. Would we could be naïve again, like the Bergsonians, and make a simple and rigid mathematics after our own wishes, instead of this Frankenstein's monster of a mathematics, that grows exuberant according to a will of its own!

Let us not be misled into supposing that mathematics is really growing less rigorous. Let us recognize the stern and stubborn precision of these novel mathematical-physical theories. But let us recognize that the mathematics popular among philosophers seems on the verge of joining other primitive mythologies. Philosophers tell us that Spinoza, for instance, tried to put his philosophy into mathematical form, with evident axioms and certain deductions. But the mathematical logicians have shown that self-evidently true axioms are no part of mathematics, and more than that, that the whole deductive-system-form is a device of exposition rather than the essence of mathematics. Philosophers have expatiated on the perfect simplicity of the "mathematical objects," these being numbers, or triangles, or mathematical points. But under Mr. Russell's analysis that Platonic world of numbers has disappeared; and now, under Professor Whitehead's analysis, the mathematical points and triangles are disappearing. Mathematics, bereft of everything that made it mathematics in the eyes of the philosophers, from axioms to infinitesimals, from triangles with angles necessarily equal to two right angles, and pairs of straight lines that can not enclose a space, to the contradictions of infinity and the independence of applied geometry from the empirical arrangements of matter—bereft of all these, mathematics goes on, greater and more triumphant than ever. When predictions based on a new use of non-Euclidean geometry recently made it possible for the first time to compare non-Euclidean and Euclidean geometry as applied to physical space, and Euclid lost, then even the man in the street heard something had happened, and was perplexed to understand it from the expositions given by our good professors of mathematics and astronomy, who had themselves been caught napping, expositions about as intelligible in most cases as the shout of the newsboys calling an extra. Everyone knew something had happened, but neither philosophers nor physicists were sure just what it was. They had suddenly been brought face to face with the startling possibility that those eccentric speculations on non-Euclidean geometries and the foundations of mathematics might somehow or other become the gateway to the science of the future, and the prospect was bewildering. Perchance some of them will now even try to read Mr. Whitehead's book—and we fear they will fail!

Professor Whitehead's book covers two hundred pages of big print. A really adequate review of the book would possibly occupy four hundred pages. Professor Whitehead has raised more questions than he has settled, felt the existence of problems he has not thought out. He has crowded into the closing chapters suggestions enough for another book—suggestions about causes and

about the relation of geometrical figures to sense, and about rhythms, including those queer rhythmic temporal structures called by the general name, "life." The present review might attempt to give neat little summaries of these, but we shall not. For then we should probably leave out the most valuable aspect of the discussion, its suggestiveness; and some reader of this review might suppose he knew the contents of Whitehead's book without reading it, and so continue to live in ignorance and self-approbation. If Professor Whitehead ever comes to perfect clearness about all the topics raised in this book, he will write another book that will be one of the great masterpieces of modern philosophy.

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Free Trade, the Tariff, and Reciprocity. F. W. TAUSSIG. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1920. Pp. ix + 219.

Professor Taussig, the former chairman of the United States Tariff Commission, has in this book gathered together a number of addresses and papers dealing with various aspects of the tariff controversy. The volume is characterized by more of unity than usually attaches to such a collection, and the reader will find in it a coherent, consistent presentation of the author's views on the main issues of the tariff question.

Mr. Taussig states his position in the opening essay. "The essence of the doctrine of free trade is that *prima facie* international trade brings a gain, and that restrictions on it presumably bring a loss. Departures from this principle, though by no means impossible of justification, need to prove their case, and if made in view of the pressure of opposing principles they are matter for regret. In this sense the doctrine of free trade, however widely rejected in the world of politics, holds its own in the sphere of the intellect" (p. 33). With force and clarity Mr. Taussig develops this thesis. In the course of his discussion he disposes of many of the popular fallacies concerning the advantages of protection which, many times refuted, still remain in circulation. Most illuminating is his treatment of "How tariffs should not be made," in which certain intimate and interesting details of tariff-making are revealed.

The final essay in the collection deals with the situation to be faced by the United States with the conclusion of peace. In a time marked by the uncertainties and confusions which characterize domestic conditions and foreign relations to-day, it is not surprising to find the author chary of dogmatism as to the future course of events. Upon the character of the ultimate peace depend the commercial relations and economic policies of the great powers. And

Mr. Taussig, with a wisdom probably in part born of his Peace Commission experience, refrains from prophecy as to what that final settlement may be.

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JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, November, 1919. *The Nature of the Community* (pp. 547–561): WILBUR M. URBAN.–"A defense of philosophic orthodoxy." By orthodoxy is meant the over-individual and monistic conception of the state. Views these two conceptions from the critical standpoints of fact and value, and defends a modified form of the orthodox conception. *The Pluralistic State* (pp. 562–575): HAROLD J. LASKI.–Advocates a pluralistic as opposed to a monistic conception of the state. A monistic state is "an hierarchial structure" with sovereignty spatially collected at the center. But such a view, it is held, is administratively incomplete and ethically inadequate. We are tending toward a partition of power on the basis of function and toward the judging of state actions by the same moral standards as any other actions. *Community as a Process* (pp. 576–588): M. P. FOLLETT.–Views community as a creating and integrating process in which the social process is patterned after Freudian psychology and the Bergsonian conception of change as qualitative. Such a view modifies the monistic conception of hierarchy, putting the inter-individual for the over-individual mind, and also puts unify*ing* for the pluralist conception of reduction to unity. *The Community and Economic Groups* (pp. 589–597): JAMES H. TUFTS.–Notes examples of the conflict between political and economic forces with brief sketch of the background of present problems. Suggests three lines of reform: extension of political organization, syndicalism and "the giving of economic groups considerable functions as committees," holding them to accountability. *Discussion: The New Rationalism and Objective Idealism:* MARY W. CALKINS, EDWARD G. SPAULDING. *Dr. Strong and Qualitative Differences:* MARGARET F. WASHBURN. Reviews of Books: W. R. Sorley, *Moral Values and the Idea of God,* G. WATTS CUNNINGHAM. J. W. Scott, *Syndicalism and Philosophical Realism,* W. P. MONTAGUE. J. S. Mackenzie, *Outlines of Social Philosophy,* WALTER G. EVERETT. James Gibson, *Locke's Theory of Knowledge and Its Historical Relations,* A. K. ROGERS. *Notices of New Books. Notes.*

PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, August, 1919. *Articles: An Experiment to Determine the Relation of Interests to Abilities* (pp.

259–262): R. HARTMAN and J. F. DASHIEL. – The present experiment employed the method of ranking relative abilities and relative interests in six simple forms of psychological tests. Tests used: Word Completion, Code Writing, Immediate Retention of Visual Impressions, Arithmetic Problem, Pitching Pennies, Letter Cancellation. The results are thought to have some significance in the light of two considerations: (*a*) the indirectness of the method of calculating the ranks in ability, and (*b*) the nature of the activities used, these being mostly paper and pencil tests of the traditional type and presumably not calculated to arouse as varied interests as would activities chosen from wider fields. *Tests of Discrimination and Multiple Choice for Vocational Diagnosis* (pp. 262–267): DAGNY SUNNE. – The McComas multiple choice experiment was given to disabled soldiers who had also been given the army Alpha Test, the Pintner Cube Test, and the Healy Picture Completion Test II. The coefficients show that the Alpha test rating would have been unfair to some of the men if used as the basis for selecting vocational courses. *The Function of Psychology in the Rehabilitation of Disabled Soldiers* (pp. 267–290): BIRD T. BALDWIN. – A report of the work done at the Walter Reed General Hospital, Takoma Park, D. C. *General Reviews and Summaries: Drugs:* A. T. POFFENBERGER. A review of eleven references on drugs. *Reading:* E. H. CAMERON. A review of the work of Breed and Wembridge and Means. *Reaction Time:* V. A. C. HENMON. A review of the work of Angell, Macht and Titchener. *Special Reviews:* G. S. Hall, *Jesus, the Christ, in the Light of Psychology:* E. S. AMES.

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NOTES AND NEWS

PROFESSOR JAMES H. TUFTS of the University of Chicago will lecture at Columbia University for the academic year 1920–21. His courses, as announced, include one on the History of American Thought, one on Moral and Political Philosophy, and a seminar in Ethical Theory.

Henry Holt & Co. announce for publication this month a new book by Professor John Dewey, entitled *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, based on the lectures which he delivered last year in Japan at the University of Tokyo.